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The provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 of 1982 
dealing with the delimitation of maritime boundaries are inherently and intentionally 
imprecise. The constructive ambiguity evident in the UNCLOS rules on boundary 
delimitation reflected the distinct lack of consensus on this issue when the Convention was 
being drafted. The advent of the Convention nonetheless led to a significant shift in approach 
to maritime boundary delimitation. Subsequent developments, as reflected in the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals and through State practice, have seen 
approaches to this issue progressively evolve and clarify. This paper traces progress and 
highlights challenges in the delimitation of maritime boundaries over the past three decades. 
It is suggested that while a clearer overall approach to delimitation has emerged, the practical 
implementation of the most recently emergent approach to maritime boundary delimitation is 
by no means free from uncertainty. 
 
 
2. A Last Minute Endeavour?: The Maritime Delimitation Provisions of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
The provisions of UNCLOS dealing with the delimitation of maritime boundaries offer scant 
guidance as to how maritime delimitation is to be achieved in practice. In particular, while 
the significant extent of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) right have 
resulted in broad areas of the oceans being subject to overlapping maritime jurisdictional 
claims, the relevant provisions of UNCLOS offer no preferred method of boundary 
delimitation. The delimitation provisions contained in UNCLOS can, however, be regarded 
as being reflecting customary international law and have been subsequently developed 
through the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals.2   
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1  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS].  
2  See, for example, E.D. BROWN, SEA-BED ENERGY AND MINERALS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIME, VOL. 1: THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 360 (1992); Elferink, A.G.O. The Impact of the Law of the 
Sea Convention on the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, ORDER FOR OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE 
 
Delimitation of the Territorial Sea 
Where overlapping territorial seas claims exist, Article 15 of UNCLOS applies. 3 This article 
states that: 
 
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the 
two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its 
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of 
the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is 
necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the 
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.  
 
For the delimitation of the territorial sea, therefore, a clear method of delimitation is 
favoured. That is, the construction of a median or equidistance line, 4  equating to a 
geometrically and geodetically exact expression of the mid-line concept.5 Departure from the 
median line may, however, be justified on the basis of the existence of an “historic title or 
other special circumstances” in the area to be delimited.6 While Article 15 provides no further 
definition of what is meant by these terms, it is notable that when the provisions relating to 
the delimitation of the territorial sea were discussed at the Third United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), the United Kingdom suggested that examples of 
special circumstances might include the presence of a navigational channel or the presence of 
small islands. 7  This approach has been termed the “equidistance/special circumstances” 
method of delimitation by international courts and tribunals.8  The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has also stated that Article 15 “is part of customary [international] law.”9 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
CENTURY 457-469, 462 (Davor Vidas & Willy Østreng, eds., 1999); and, Robert Beckman & Clive 
Schofield, Moving Beyond Disputes Over Island Sovereignty: ICJ Decision Sets Stage for Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation in the Singapore Strait, 40 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 1-35, 12 (2009) [hereinafter 
Moving Beyond Disputes]. Similarly, with the exception of Part XI of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), dealing with seabed mining regime in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction, the United States has specifically stated that it regards UNCLOS as reflective of customary 
international law. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE 
MARITIME CLAIMS 4-6 (1996). 
3  Article 3 of UNCLOS provides that states have the right to establish a territorial sea “not exceeding 12 
nautical miles” measured from its baselines. Article 15 of UNCLOS represents a near verbatim 
repetition of Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. See, 
UNCLOS, supra note 3, art 3. 
4  The terms “equidistance line” and “median line” are used interchangeably in the present context 
although it is recognised that the latter terms is more commonly applied to equidistance lines between 
opposite coastlines.  
5  Chris Carleton & Clive Schofield, Developments in the Technical Determination of Maritime Space: 
Delimitation, Dispute Resolution, Geographical Information Systems and the Role of the Technical 
Expert, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 3, no.4, Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 2002 at 7. 
See also, S.W. Boggs, Problems of Water-Boundary Definition: Median Lines and International 
Boundaries through Territorial Waters, 27 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 445-456 (July 1937):; and R.D. 
Hodgson, & E.J. Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of a Modern Equidistant Boundary, 3 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L L. 361-388 (1976). 
6  UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 15. 
7  UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, VOL. II 135 (S.N. 
Nandan, & S. Rosenne, eds.,.1993). See also, Moving Beyond Disputes , supra note 1, at 11. 
8  See, for example, the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303 ¶ 288 [hereinafter Cameroon/Nigeria Case]. 
9  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 2001  
I.C.J. 40, ¶175 (Mar. 16) [hereinafter Qatar/Bahrain Case]. 
 
Delimitation of the EEZ and Continental Shelf 
UArticles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS, dealing with delimitation of the continental shelf and 
EEZ respectively, call in identical general terms for delimitation to be “effected by agreement” 
or, pending agreement, “provisional arrangements of a practical nature” may be entered into 
for a “transitional period”.10 Other than a general statement that such agreements are  to be 
reached on the basis of international law in order to achieve “an equitable solution”, 
UNCLOS is silent concerning  how agreements are to be reached in practical terms.11 In 
particular, no preferred method of delimitation is indicated. This contrasts sharply with the 
relevant provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf which stated, 
analogously to the rules on the delimitation of the territorial sea, that delimitation of the 
continental shelf was to be effected by the use of median lines unless agreement to the 
contrary or “special circumstances” existed that justified an alternative approach.12  
 
The marked shift away from equidistance as a preferred method of delimitation, at least with 
respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf and newly introduced EEZ, resulted from  
lack of consensus at UNCLOS III on the inclusion of equidistance as a preferred method of 
delimitation for the continental shelf and EEZ. This, in turn, translated into the ambiguous 
wording contained in UNCLOS. 
 
International courts and tribunals have termed the method of delimitation applicable to EEZ 
and continental shelf delimitation as contained in Articles 74 and 83 (and in customary 
international law) as the equitable principles/relevant circumstances method. For example, in 
the Cameroon/Nigeria Case the ICJ stated explicitly that: 
 
The Court has on various occasions made it clear what the applicable criteria, 
principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering several zones of 
coincident jurisdictions is to be determined. They are expressed in the so-
called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method.13 
 
The Court went on to note that this method is “very similar to the equidistance/special 
circumstances” method applicable in delimitation of the territorial sea.14 
 
The vague nature of these articles, which were among the last to be agreed at UNCLOS III, 
resulted from disagreement between the negotiating States. The difference of view was 
essentially between two camps – whilst some States preferred an “equidistance/special 
circumstances” rule, others favoured delimitation on the basis of “principles of equity.”  The 
end result was compromise text which places particular emphasis on the objective of the 
delimitation, utilising an alternative form of words not reflective of either side’s view and 
thus acceptable to both.15 As the Arbitral Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration stated in 
reference to Article 83, this was “a last minute endeavour…to get agreement on a very 
controversial matter”, and  therefore, “consciously designed to decide as little as possible.”16 
                                                          
10  UNCLOS, supra note 3, arts. 74 & 83. 
11  UNCLOS, supra note 3, arts. 74 & 83. 
12  Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, art. 6.  
13  Cameroon/Nigeria Case, supra note 8, at ¶ 288. 
14  Id. 
15  Moving Beyond Disputes, supra note 1, at 11-12. 
16  Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, Second Phase, ¶ 116. (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999), available at  
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160. 
 
The UNCLOS provisions relating to maritime boundary delimitation provide limited 
substantive guidance to those tasked with seeking a maritime boundary. These provisions can 
therefore be interpreted in contrasting ways. If one takes a ‘glass half-full’ perspective, they 
can be viewed as offering great flexibility to coastal States. The counterpoint is that the 
UNCLOS provisions on the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ are overly vague, 
providing scant clear guidance, and consequently offer considerable scope for conflicting 
interpretations leading to maritime boundary disputes. However, the subsequent practice of 
international courts and tribunals, particularly in recent years, has served to elaborate on the 
minimalist foundations contained in the text of UNCLOS itself. 
 
 
3. The Evolution of Ocean Boundary Making 
 
In light of the fundamental flexibility or, alternatively, the inherent vagueness of the 
UNCLOS provisions on the delimitation of maritime boundaries, it is unsurprising that State 
practice in respect of the delimitation of maritime boundaries is characterised by diversity.17 
Indeed, the most systematic survey of State practice in maritime delimitation to date reached 
the conclusion that no normative principle of international law had developed that would lead 
inexorably to determining the specific location of any particular maritime boundary line.18 
The lack of specificity in the approach of the ICJ and other international tribunals in the past 
led to their decisions being criticised for advancing “numerous approaches, rules and 
concepts,” but failing to articulate clear principles, instead producing “a bewildering array of 
quasi-principles” leading to considerable uncertainty regarding their delimitation decisions.19 
 
Although the factors, or potentially relevant circumstances, that need to be taken into 
consideration in the delimitation equation, and lead to the adjustment of, for example, a 
provisional equidistance line, are theoretically limitless, nonetheless, it has become 
abundantly clear from the practice of States allied to the rulings of international courts and 
tribunals, that coastal geography has a critical role to play in the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries. Aspects of coastal geography that have proved especially influential include the 
configuration of the coasts under consideration, the relative coastal lengths and the potential 
impact of outstanding geographical features, notably islands.20  
 
The salient role of coastal geography in maritime boundary delimitation is directly linked to 
the widespread use of equidistant lines. Equidistance lines have proved extremely popular as 
a method or basis for maritime delimitation in practice. The construction of equidistance lines 
offer considerable advantages – if there is agreement on the baselines to be used, there is only 
one strict equidistance line and this provides the appeal of mathematical certainty and 
objectivity as well as affording coastal States the not inconsiderable attraction of jurisdiction 
                                                          
17  For example, Jonathan I. Charney, The American Society of International Law Maritime Boundary 
Project, 5 MARITIME BOUNDARIES 1-17 (Gerald H. Blake, ed., 1994).[hereinafter Maritime Boundary 
Project]. 
18  Id. at 9-10, see also JONATHAN I. CHARNEY & LEWIS M. ALEXANDER, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES xlii (1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES].  
19  Ian Townsend-Gault, Maritime Boundaries in the Arabian Gulf,, THE RAZOR’S EDGE: INTERNATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 223,  224-227 (Clive Schofield, David Newman, Alasdair 
Drysdale, & Janet Allison-Brown, eds., 2002). 
20  VICTOR PRESCOTT & CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 219-
222 (2005) [hereinafter MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES]; and Moving Beyond Disputes, supra note 
1, at 12. 
over those maritime areas closest to them. Equidistance lines can also be flexibly applied and 
may be simplified, adjusted or modified to take specific geographical circumstances into 
account.21 In practice the equidistance method has proved more popular than any alternative 
method and most agreed maritime boundaries are based on some form of equidistance.22 
Consequently, equidistance lines are often constructed at least as a means of assessing a 
maritime boundary situation or as the starting point for discussions in the context of maritime 
boundary negotiations.23 Such lines have also frequently been adopted as the basis for a final 
delimitation line.  
 
In contrast, the past jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals would seem to indicate 
that factors such as marked differences between the land areas belonging to each State 
involved would be unlikely to prove influential in this context.24 Similarly, socio-economic 
arguments based on disparities in the wealth and size of population of the States concerned 
that is, that one party to a dispute is relatively economically disadvantaged as compared with 
the other party to the dispute, have received short shrift before the ICJ. On more than one 
occasion the Court has held that such factors are not of relevance as they are liable to 
significant change over time. For example, in the Tunisia/Libya Case, Tunisia argued its 
poverty relative to Libya. The Court’s responded that:  
 
...these economic considerations cannot be taken into account for the 
delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to each Party.  They are 
virtually extraneous factors since they are variables which unpredictable 
national fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt 
the scale one way or the other.  A country might be poor today and become 
rich tomorrow as a result of an event such as the discovery of a valuable 
economic resource.25  
 
That said, it can be observed that the Court has tended to be reluctant to entirely dismiss 
potential relevant circumstances (however, see below regarding geophysical factors). Thus, 
with respect to issues of a socio-economic nature, the Court left the door slightly ajar to 
consideration of such factors as relate to fishing, navigation, security or seabed resources as a 
test of the equitability of the result. Indeed the ICJ ruled that they are generally to be 
disregarded unless to do so would entail “catastrophic repercussions” for the States concerned 
and this view was articulated in the Gulf of Maine Case.26 Similarly, it was on the basis of 
this approach that the Court, when considering such issues in the case between Denmark and 
Norway concerning maritime boundary delimitation in the area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen, took into account fisheries issues in the shape of a migratory stock of capelin in the 
                                                          
21  Carleton and Schofield, 2002: 7-31; Legault & Hankey, Method, Oppositeness & Adjacency, & 
Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra 
note 21, 203-242 [hereinafter Method, Oppositeness & Adjacency]; MARITIME POLITICAL 
BOUNDARIES, supra note 23, at 236. 
22  Method, Oppositeness & Adjacency, supra note 24, at 205. For example, of 157 maritime boundary 
agreements concluded by the year 2000, 124 of them (79 per cent) were based on some form of 
equidistance line. See also, MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 23, at 239. 
23  Carleton and Schofield, 2002: 54-56. 
24  MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 23, at 220; and ROBIN ROLF CHURCHILL & ALAN 
VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 188-190 (1999). 
25  Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J.,18,  ¶107 (Feb. 24), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/63/6267.pdf [hereinafter the Tunisia/Libya Case].  
26  Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J..246, ¶ 237 (Oct. 
12). 
area to be delimited.27 This resulted in the final delimitation line being shifted eastwards of 
the Court’s provisional equidistance line and the division of Zone 1 into two parts so as to 
ensure equitable access to the fishery.28 Nevertheless, according to this view the delimitation 
“reaffirmed the irrelevance of socio-economic factors (other than resource-related factors) to 
equitable maritime delimitation.”29  
 
In a similar vein, while international courts and tribunals have not wholly dismissed 
arguments that a de facto boundary line is already in existence based on the past conduct of 
the parties, they have tended to err on the side of caution. For example, in the 2007 
Nicaragua-Honduras Case the ICJ ruled that evidence of a tacit legal agreement “must be 
compelling.”30 The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) shared this view 
that there should be a ‘high bar’ in terms of evidence that such a de facto or tacit agreement 
exists through its decision in the Bay of Bengal Case that Bangladesh’s arguments, 
particularly concerning documents arising from bilateral negotiations indicating agreement 
on a particular boundary line for territorial sea delimitation, fell short of proving the existence 
of such an agreement.31 
 
 
4. A Key Impact of UNCLOS – the Demise of Geophysical Factors in Delimitation 
 
The advent of the Convention did induce a major shift in thinking related to ocean boundary 
making. It led directly to a decline in the significance of geophysical factors to the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries, or at least in respect of the delimitation of the EEZ, has 
declined in importance. Where once arguments based on concepts of “natural prolongation” 
expressed through the composition (geology) and configuration (geomorphology) of the 
seafloor were determinative factors in the delimitation of, particularly, continental shelf 
boundaries,32 to a large extent this is no longer the case.  
 
In the Libya-Malta Case of 1985 before the ICJ, Libya contended that a “Rift Zone” lay 
between the parties of such a profound character, described as a “fundamental discontinuity”, 
that it should form the basis of the continental shelf boundary between the two States.33 
Ultimately, however, the Court decided to do away with geophysical arguments in their 
                                                          
27  Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 
(Jun. 14) [hereinafter Jan Mayen Case]. 
28  B. Kwiatkowska, Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation as Exemplified in the Work of the 
International Court of Justice During the Presidency of Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings and Beyond, 28 
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L.,91-145,105 (1997). 
29  Id. 
30  Case Concerning Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras [2007], I.C.J. 
Reports 659. 
31  Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the 
Bay of Bengal, (Bangl. v. Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, [hereinafter Bay of Bengal 
Case], at 117-118. 
32  The ICJ, through its Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, had introduced the concept of 
natural prolongation such that coastal States have rights over that part of the continental shelf that 
constitutes “a natural prolongation of its land territory” and determined that this should be a key 
consideration in delimiting the continental shelf. The ICJ ruled that: The ICJ ruled that: “delimitation is 
to be effected…in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each party all those parts of the 
continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, 
without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of another state.” See North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 12, at ¶ 101.   
33  Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J.,13,  ¶ 36 (June 3), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf [hereinafter the Libya/Malta Case].  
entirety, at least in relation to those areas within 200 nautical miles of the coast.  The Court 
therefore found that, on the basis of “new developments in international law”, that is, the 
opening of the UNCLOS for signature in 1982 and the introduction of the EEZ concept, as 
there was less than 400 nautical miles between the parties’ coastlines, “the geological and 
geomorphological characteristics of those areas...are completely immaterial”, and that: 
 
...since the development of the law enables a State to claim that the continental 
shelf appertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast, 
whatever the geological characteristics of the corresponding seabed and 
subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any role to geological or geophysical 
factors within that distance either in verifying the legal title of the States 
concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as between their claims.34 
 
The Court’s decision was based on the development of the concept of the EEZ introduced as 
part of UNCLOS. Thus, whereas previously the geology and geomorphology of the seabed 
were regarded as highly influential considerations, the rise of the EEZ has led to a 
reassessment such that geophysical factors are essentially irrelevant to delimitation within 
200 nautical miles of the coast. The introduction of the EEZ and the 200 nautical miles 
distance principle that this entails has effectively eliminated geophysical factors as relevant 
circumstances in the applicable equitable principles/relevant circumstances delimitation 
equation. This development has, with some irony, been referred to as little more than a 
“disguised throwback to equidistance.”35  
 
Nonetheless, natural prolongation-based arguments persist, for example, Australia argues that 
much of the continental shelf underlying the Timor Sea is Australian rather than Indonesian 
or East Timorese on the basis of natural prolongations arguments.36 Similarly, both China and 
the Republic of Korea utilise natural prolongation-based arguments in the East China Sea.37 
Indeed, Bangladesh advanced analogous arguments in the Bay of Bengal Case but to scant 
effect (see below). While a number of States do still base their continental shelf claims on 
such considerations, Bangladesh’s experience before ITLOS suggests that States relying on 
natural prolongation-inspired arguments in the context of a maritime boundary determined 
through binding third-party international judicial dispute resolution should be less than 
sanguine as to their chances of securing a successful outcome. 
 
It is also the case that such factors potentially remain highly relevant to submissions relating 
to outer continental shelf limits beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast and to the 
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries on shared margins extending seawards of the 200 
nautical miles EEZ limit. For example, it has been suggested that “after a hiatus since 1985, 
geological and geomorphological factors will re-emerge in the law of maritime delimitation 
                                                          
34 Id. at ¶ 39. See also, K. Highet, The Use of Geophysical Factors in the Delimitation of Maritime 
Boundaries, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 163-202, supra note 21, at 177 [hereinafter 
Geophysical Factors]. 
35 Geophysical Factors, supra note 35, 183. 
36  See, for example, Clive Schofield, Minding the Gap: The Australia – East Timor Treaty on Certain 
Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, INT’L J. OF MAR. & COASTAL L. 189-234 (2007),190-202.  
37  See, for example, Gao Jianjun, Joint Development in the East China Sea: Not an Easier Challenge than 
Delimitation, 23 INT’L J. OF MAR. & COASTAL L. 60-61 (2008); and, Schofield, C.H. and Townsend-
Gault, I. (2011) ‘Choppy Waters Ahead in a “sea of peace, cooperation and friendship”?: Slow 
Progress Towards the Application of Maritime Joint Development to the East China Sea’, Marine 
Policy, Vol.35: 25-33, at 27. 
of the outer continental shelf.”38 However, once again the outcome of the Bay of Bengal Case 
suggests otherwise (see below). 
 
Nevertheless, clearer guidance on maritime delimitation has emerged over time as to how 
international courts and tribunals approach the challenge of maritime boundary delimitation. 
This included the emergence of a two-stage approach of constructing an equidistance line in 
the first instance and then examining factors that might lead to its modification at the second 
stage. Further evolutions have recently taken place, however. In particular this can be seen 
through the lens of the ICJ’s ruling in the Black Sea Case of February 2009, the first maritime 
delimitation case brought before ITLOS, the Bay of Bengal Case of March 2012, at the time 
of writing, most recent ICJ decision involving maritime boundary delimitation, the 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute Case between Colombia and Nicaragua of November 2012. 
 
 
5. Recent Developments 
 
The Black Sea Case 
In a notable development, in the Black Sea Case the Court articulated a three-stage approach 
to the delimitation of a maritime boundary. First, and “[i]n keeping with its settled 
jurisprudence on maritime delimitation”, 39  a provisional delimitation line should be 
established using geometrically objective methods.40 In this context it was stated that “an 
equidistance line will be drawn unless there are compelling reasons that make this unfeasible 
in the particular case” [emphasis added]. 41  While a two-stage process, involving the 
construction of a provisional delimitation line based on equidistance and then consideration 
of factors that might lead to the adjustment of that provisional line in pursuit of the goal of an 
equitable result, had been applied on a number of occasions previously, 42  this explicit 
preference for an equidistance line as the starting point for maritime delimitation marks a 
significant development as it contrasts with previous, rather more circumspect, statements on 
the part of the Court on this issue.  
 
For example, in the Libya-Malta Case, the ICJ observed that: “The Court is unable to accept 
that, even as a preliminary and provisional step towards the drawing of a median line, a 
                                                          
38  See, D.A. Colson, Note, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf Between Neighboring States, 
97 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 107 (2003). See also, D.A. Colson, Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf 
Between States with Opposite or Adjacent Coasts, LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL 
SHELF LIMITS 287-293 (Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, & Tomas H. Heidar, eds., 2004). 
39  Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 61, ¶  118 (Feb. 3)  
[hereinafter Black Sea Case]. 
40  Id. at ¶ 116. 
41  Id. 
42  For example in the Jan Mayen Case concerning maritime delimitation between Denmark (on behalf of 
Greenland) and Norway (in respect of Jan Mayen Island) in 1993, in the Qatar/Bahrain Case in 2001, 
in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case in 2002, and in the Guyana/Surinam Arbitration in 2007. See, Case 
Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway), [1993] ICJ Reports, 38; Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 40; Land and Maritime 
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provisional equidistance line must be drawn” [emphasis in original].43 Similarly, and more 
recently, in the Court’s Judgment in the Nicaragua/Honduras Case of 2007, the ICJ referred 
to the widespread use of equidistance lines in the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the 
merits, or “certain intrinsic value”, of this method of delimitation on account of its “scientific 
character and the relative ease with which it can be applied.” However, the Court reached the 
conclusion that “the equidistance method does not automatically have priority over other 
methods of delimitation” as “there may be factors which make the application of the 
equidistance method inappropriate” [emphasis added]. 44  Indeed, the ICJ concluded the 
particular circumstances of that case, where the starting point for the maritime boundary 
constituted the mouth of a river subject to substantial and rapid change in location over time 
thanks the accretion and erosion of sediments emanating from the river system made the 
application of equidistance impractical as such a line constructed now might well be rendered 
“arbitrary and unreasonable in the near future.”45   
 
It can, however, be observed that the provisional line drawn by the Court in the Black Sea 
Case was not a strict equidistance line from all features in the relevant area as the Court was 
selective regarding the basepoints to be used (see below). In the same manner in which the 
ICJ had previously ignored the Maltese islet of Filfla in the Malta/Libya Case (see below), 
the Court in the Black Sea Case decided not to utilise Serpents’ Island as a basepoint for the 
drawing of the provisional equidistance line. Giving “specific” attention to Serpents’ Island 
in the determination of the provisional equidistance line the Court stated: 
 
In connection with the selection of base points, the Court observes that there 
have been instances when coastal islands have been considered part of a 
State’s coast, in particular when a coast is made up of a cluster or fringe of 
islands…However, Serpents’ Island lying alone some 20 nautical miles away 
from the mainland, is not one of a cluster or fringe of islands constituting the 
“coast” of Ukraine. 
 
To count Serpents’ Island as a relevant part of the coast would amount to 
grafting an extraneous element onto Ukraine’s coast; the consequence would 
be judicial refashioning of geography, which neither the law nor practice of 
maritime delimitation authorizes [emphasis added].46 
 
The Court emphasised the point by remarking that: 
 
Serpents’ Island cannot serve as a base point for the construction of the 
provisional equidistance line…since it does not form part of the general 
configuration of the coast.47 
 
Arguably, to completely ignore part of the coast, that is, Serpents’ Island, also constitutes a 
judicial refashioning of geography. However, the Court appears to have deemed that the use 
                                                          
43  Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment of 3 June 1985, 
[1985] ICJ Reports,13, (hereinafter the Libya/Malta Case), at 43. 
44  Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. 
Hond.), 2007 I.C.J.  120, ¶ 272 (Oct. 8), available at, <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=14&case=120&code=nh&p3=4> [hereinafter 
Nicaragua/Honduras Case]. 
45  Id., at 277. 
46  Black Sea Case, supra note 40, ¶ 149. 
47  Id. at ¶ 186. 
Serpents’ Island as a basepoint would have had a disproportionate and distorting impact on 
the construction of a strict equidistance line.  
 
Once a provisional, equidistance-based, delimitation line has been established, at the second 
stage the Court is to assess “whether there are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of 
the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result.”48 The third stage 
outlined by the Court in the Black Sea Case, involved the verification of the line resulting 
potential delimitation line, which may or may not have been adjusted, through what the Court 
termed a “disproportionality test”49 in order to ascertain that it,  
 
…does not, as it stands, lead to an inequitable result by reason of any marked 
disproportion between the ratio of the respective coastal lengths and the ratio 
between the relevant maritime area of each State by reference to the 
delimitation line. A final check for an equitable outcome entails a confirmation 
that no great disproportionality of maritime areas is evident by comparison to the 
ratio of coastal lengths .50 
 
The Court did, however, take care to assert that this (dis)proportionality test “is not to suggest 
that these respective areas should be proportionate to coastal lengths.”51 When it came to 
applying the “disproportionality test” in the context of the Black Sea Case the Court noted 
that such a check “can only be approximate” in light of the “[d]iverse techniques” that can be 
used to assess coastal lengths and the lack of clear requirements in international law as to 
whether the “real” coastline or baselines are to be followed or whether coasts relating to 
internal waters should be excluded.52  The Court found that the ratio of relevant coastal 
lengths for Romania and Ukraine was approximately 1:2.8, that the ratio of relevant maritime 
areas of the order of 1:2.1.53  Following careful checking, the Court concluded that this 
difference between the ratio of relevant coastal lengths and maritime areas did not constitute 
a disproportion and that consequently no further adjustment to the delimitation line was 
required at the third stage.54 
 
The Bay of Bengal Case 
In the Bay of Bengal Case between Bangladesh and Myanmar, seawards of the territorial sea 
delimitation where equidistance was applied in keeping with Article 15 of UNCLOS, the 
Tribunal decided that the equidistance/special circumstances approach constituted the 
appropriate method for delimitation, and opted to apply the three-stage approach pioneered in 
the Black Sea Case.55 Accordingly, the Tribunal first constructed a provisional boundary line 
based on equidistance.56 However, the provisional delimitation line so defined was not a strict 
equidistance line as St. Martin’s island was excluded as a basepoint in its construction, 
notwithstanding Bangladesh’s assertions that the island fulfils the criteria of Article 121(1) of 
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UNCLOS and should therefore be entitled to not only a 12 nautical miles territorial sea but 
also its own continental shelf and EEZ.57 Here the distinct contrasts between St. Martin’s 
Island and Serpents’ Island can be remarked upon. St. Martin’s Island is a considerably 
bigger feature than Serpents’ Island (0.135km2 versus around 8km2) as well as hosting a 
permanent population of approximately 7,000 people as compared with government 
personnel only. Additionally, St. Martin’s Island is, according to Bangladesh, the island is 
extensively cultivated and able to produce “enough food to meet a significant proportion of 
the needs of its residents.”58 
 
The Tribunal determined that as a consequence of the island’s location “immediately in front 
of the mainland on Myanmar’s side of the Parties’ land boundary”, use of the island as a 
basepoint “would result in a line that blocks the seaward projection of Myanmar’s coast”, 
leading to “an unwarranted distortion of the delimitation line.”59 This scenario was analogous 
to the ICJ’s treatment of Serpents’ Island in the Black Sea Case,60 a decision which was duly 
cited by the Tribunal in support of its treatment of St. Martin’s Island.61  
 
Subsequent to drawing the provisional delimitation line, the Tribunal proceeded to determine 
whether there existed any reasons to adjust or modify that line in order to achieve an 
equitable delimitation 62  Bangladesh argued persuasively that the concave character of 
Bangladesh’s coastline would mean that the application of strict equidistance line maritime 
boundaries would result in its maritime entitlements being severely and inequitably 
curtailed. 63  The Tribunal ruled that Bangladesh’s coast is “manifestly concave” 64  and 
considered it appropriate to adjust the provisional equidistance line in such a way as to 
relieve the resulting ‘cut off’ effect on Bangladesh’s maritime entitlements.65 It did so by 
adjusting the equidistance line “at the point where it begins to cut off the seaward projection 
of the Bangladesh coast”, considered to be from a point on the provisional delimitation line 
due south of Kutubia Island where the Bangladeshi coastline makes an abrupt change in 
direction, and then proceeding along a geodetic line with an azimuth of 215º (see Figure 2).66 
The Tribunal offered no mathematical formula for such an adjustment. It can also be 
observed that while the Tribunal rejected Bangladesh’s preferred method of delimitation, that 
of an angle-bisector, 67  it remarkably nonetheless eventually came up with an identical 
azimuth for its adjusted equidistance line (215º). This raises some question that the 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line might have to an extent been informed or 
influenced by Bangladesh’s angle-bisector proposals. 
 
Finally, a proportionality test was undertaken to ensure that the proposed delimitation line 
was equitable.68 The Tribunal calculated the ratio of relevant coasts to be 1:1.42 in favour of 
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Myanmar with the ratio of maritime spaces allocated on the basis of the adjusted delimitation 
line determined to be 1:1.54 in Myanmar’s favour.69 On comparing these ratios, the Tribunal 
ruled that no significant disproportion between them existed, warranting further adjustment of 
the delimitation line.70 
 
As noted above, with respect to delimitation of the EEZ within 200 nautical miles of the 
coast, the Tribunal rejected Bangladesh’s arguments based on geological and 
geomorphological factors on the grounds that delimitation of a single maritime boundary 
applicable to both the seabed and subsoil and also to the superjacent water column should be 
delimited on the basis of coastal geography rather than on the basis of the geology and 
geomorphology of the seabed. 71  Seaward of the 200 nautical miles limit, in delimiting 
extended continental shelf areas, the Tribunal once again rejected arguments based on the 
composition (geology) and shape (geomorphology) of the seabed.72 This finding appears to 
bode ill for coastal States whose claims remain reliant on the concept of natural prolongation 
and therefore geophysical factors. That may be the case, at least as far as the treatment of 
such arguments before international courts and tribunals is concerned which, in turn, 
probably explains why these States are apparently reluctant to resort to such means to delimit 
their maritime boundaries.  
 
The Tribunal went on to rule that as there was only one continental shelf with no essential 
difference between those parts of it within and seaward of the 200 nautical miles limit,73 the 
method of delimitation applied within 200 nautical miles of the coast should also apply 
beyond that limit.74 Finding that the cut-off effect produced by the marked concavity of 
Bangladesh’s coastline has “continuing effect” beyond 200 nautical miles, the Tribunal opted 
to continue the delimitation line for the extended continental shelf along the same 215º 
azimuth line relevant to the delimitation of the EEZ.75 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Judgment is the Tribunal’s creation of a so-called 
“grey area”, measuring approximately 1,100km2, where continental shelf rights are 
determined to belong to one of the parties (Bangladesh) but jurisdiction concerning the 
overlying water column rest with the other party (Myanmar). This situation arises because of 
the adjustment of the provisional boundary line. As a result, the grey area is located beyond 
200 nautical miles from Bangladesh, and from the Bangladeshi perspective is an area of 
extended continental shelf, yet is within 200 nautical miles of Myanmar. 
 
While innovative, the definition of the grey area arguably leaves the parties with potentially 
contentious issues to resolve in the future, especially with respect to as yet unresolved ocean 
governance arrangements. In this context, it is worth noting that the pivotal event that led to 
this case being brought before ITLOS was the discovery of gas deposits in the disputed 
regions, the unilateral authorization of exploration concessions by Myanmar in 2008, and the 
armed response by Bangladesh.76  
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The Colombia – Nicaragua Case 
In the, at the time of writing, most recent international case dealing with maritime boundary 
delimitation, the Territorial and Maritime Dispute Case between Colombia and Nicaragua, on 
which the ICJ rendered its Judgment in November 2012, analogous approaches were in 
evidence.77 Perhaps of most significance, once again the three-stage approach was adopted.78 
This was in spite of the geographical complexities of the case,79 where numerous Colombian 
islands, notably San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina and associated features, face the 
Nicaraguan mainland coastal front at a distance of approximately 105-125 nautical miles (while 
simultaneously being of the order of 380 nautical miles from the mainland of Colombia).80 
Although there was little doubt that at least some of the Colombian islands relevant to the 
delimitation are indeed capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights –  San Andrés 
hosting a population of over 70,000 and Providencia one of 5,000,81  this scenario led to 
strenuous protestations on the part of Nicaragua concerning the application of the three-stage 
approach.  
 
In Nicaragua’s view the three-stage process would be inappropriate on the grounds that the 
construction of an equidistance line between the Nicaraguan mainland and Colombia’s islands 
would be “wholly artificial” in that it would treat the islands as though they were the opposing 
mainland coast.82 Consequently, even if the provisional equidistance line were to be shifted at 
the second stage of the process, an equitable result would be precluded.83 Nicaragua instead 
proposed enclaving Colombia’s islands. Perhaps unsurprisingly Colombia was in favour of the 
application of the three-stage approach, starting with the construction of an equidistance-based 
provisional delimitation line. 
 
Despite the geographical challenges involved in the Colombia-Nicaragua Case, the Court 
concluded that the construction of a provisional equidistance line was not impossible. 84 
However, the Court simultaneously recognised the existence of overlapping entitlements to the 
east of Colombia’s islands and thus “behind the base points on the Colombian side from which 
the provisional equidistance/median line is constructed.”85 The Court adopted innovative means 
to overcome this apparent conundrum. In particular, the Court concluded that substantial 
adjustments should be made to the provisional equidistance line, in a ratio of 3:1o in Nicaragua’s 
favour, in large part as a consequence of the disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts in 
play.86 Additionally, to the north and south of the “weighted line” so constructed, Nicaragua was 
awarded maritime areas out to 200 nautical miles.87  This was achieved through restricting 
certain Colombian insular features, notably Quiatsueño, Roncador and Serrana in the north and 
Albuquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays in the south, to 12 nautical mile territorial seas.88 In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://www.aseanaffairs.com/myanmar_bangladesh_maritime_dispute_tension_rises_as_bangladesh_se
nds_another_warship.  
77   Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, 19 November 2012, at 191-193, 
available at <www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/17164.pdf>. 
78  Id. at 191-194. 
79  Id. at 18-24. 
80  Id., at 22. 
81  Id. 
82  Id., at. 185. 
83  Id. 
84  Id., at 195. 
85  Id., at 196. 
86  Id., at 234. 
87  Id., at 236. 
88  Id. at 237.  
this context Quiatsueño and Serrana were wholly enclaved with the former being specifically 
acknowledged as a “rock” within the meaning of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS.89 Consequently, 
and despite the geographical complexities and peculiarities involved, application of the three-
stage process was maintained. 
 
 
6. Progress and Challenges 
 
UNCLOS induced a major shift in ocean boundary making and this has been sustained over 
time. Significant further developments have taken place over the last three decades including 
the emergence of first a two-stage approach to maritime delimitation and more recently a 
three-stage approach. Indeed, recent decisions appear to indicate some consolidation as 
maritime boundary delimitation methodology on the part of international courts and tribunals 
These are positive developments in that they appear to offer enhanced clarity and consistence 
in terms of the overall approach to maritime delimitation in this context. These virtues are 
also, in all likelihood, liable to feed through into developing State practice. Indeed, while it is 
acknowledged that, strictly speaking, arbitral and judicial decisions are only binding on the 
parties to the particular case and each case features its own particular facts and 
circumstances, international judicial decisions are clearly influential. This is illustrated by the 
way in which national claims tend to be bolstered by reference to past judicial decisions as a 
means of adding support and legitimacy to particular positions. 
 
Although these developments are broadly positive, significant uncertainty remains. In 
particular, the emerging trend towards selectivity in choice of basepoints prior to constructing 
the provisional delimitation line is arguably troubling. After all, to ignore certain potentially 
critical basepoints itself represents a judicial refashioning of geography that serves to 
undermine the clarity and consistency of the three-stage process. An alternative option, and 
one that might be viewed as more rigorous, impartial and methodologically systematic, would 
have been to draw the strict equidistance line including all potential basepoints and then to 
adjust or modify the provisional delimitation line at the second stage of the three-stage 
process. Such an adjustment could, in fact, have led to the adjustment of a strict equidistance 
line so as to award certain problematic features, such as Serpents’ Island and St. Martin’s 
Island for example, a nil effect, thereby yielding the same result but in an arguably more 
logical and elegant manner.  
 
It can, however, be observed that both the ICJ’s and Tribunal’s treatment of relatively small 
islands in the shape of Serpents’ Island and St. Martin’s Island, as well as certain features in 
the Colombia-Nicaragua Case, that is, awarding these features nil effect at the first stage of 
the delimitation process is consistent with a growing trend in the treatment of islands in the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries, especially those that are small and sparsely inhabited or 
are located far from the coast or in such a manner as to significantly and potentially 
inequitably impact on an equidistance line-based boundary. This overall trend is welcome in 
that it tends to downplay the potential significance of the sort of tiny, remote or 
problematically positioned insular features that are frequently the focus of maritime disputes.  
                                                          
89  Id. While the Court accorded these features no more than territorial sea rights, it generally did not 
address their status with respect to Article 121 of UNCLOS (Id., at 180). Nonetheless, the Court 
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Overall, therefore, considerable progress has been made in respect of ocean boundary making 
but, perhaps inevitably, significant scope for subjectivity and discretion on the part of courts 
and tribunals remains present in the maritime delimitation equation. Consequently, 
considerable challenges exist in terms of the practical application of contemporary 
approaches to the delimitation of maritime boundaries and the task of attempting to predict 
the final location of yet to be delimited maritime boundaries remains a hazardous one. 
 
 
 
 
